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Nutrition	Labelling	is	a	Trade	Policy	Issue:	Lessons	From	an	Analysis	of	Specific	
Trade	Concerns	at	the	World	Trade	Organization	
	
Anne	Marie	Thow,	Corinna	Hawkes,	Alexandra	Jones,	Iqra	Ali,	Ronald	Labonte	
	
Health	Promotion	International	(In	Press)	
	
Summary	Interpretive	nutrition	labels	provide	simplified	nutrient-specific	text	and/or	symbols	on	the	front	of	pre-packaged	foods,	to	encourage	and	enable	consumers	to	make	healthier	choices.	This	type	of	labelling	has	been	proposed	as	part	of	a	comprehensive	policy	response	to	the	global	epidemic	of	non-communicable	diseases.	However,	regulation	of	nutrition	labelling	falls	under	the	remit	of	not	just	the	health	sector	but	also	trade.	Specific	Trade	Concerns	have	been	raised	at	the	World	Trade	Organization’s	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	Committee	regarding	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	initiatives	in	Thailand,	Chile,	Indonesia,	Peru	and	Ecuador.	This	paper	presents	an	analysis	of	the	discussions	of	these	concerns.	Although	nutrition	labelling	was	identified	as	a	legitimate	policy	objective,	queries	were	raised	regarding	the	justification	of	the	specific	labelling	measures	proposed,	and	the	scientific	evidence	for	effectiveness	of	such	measures.	Concerns	were	also	raised	regarding	the	consistency	of	the	measures	with	international	standards.	Drawing	on	policy	learning	theory,	we	identified	four	lessons	for	public	health	policy	makers,	including:	strategic	framing	of	nutrition	labelling	policy	objectives;	pro-active	policy	engagement	between	trade	and	health	to	identify	potential	trade	issues;	identifying	ways	to	minimise	potential	‘practical’	trade	concerns;	and	engagement	with	the	Codex	Alimentarius	Commission	to	develop	international	
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guidance	on	interpretative	labelling.	This	analysis	indicates	that	while	there	is	potential	for	trade	sector	concerns	to	stifle	innovation	in	nutrition	labelling	policy,	care	in	how	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	measures	are	crafted	in	light	of	trade	commitments	can	minimize	such	a	risk	and	help	ensure	that	trade	policy	is	coherent	with	nutrition	action.		
Key	words:	Nutrition	labelling,	trade	policy,	policy	coherence	
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Introduction	The	global	epidemic	of	non-communicable	diseases	(NCDs)	is	associated	with	devastating	personal,	social,	health	care	and	economic	costs.	In	the	Political	Declaration	on	the	Prevention	and	Control	of	Non-communicable	Diseases	adopted	at	the	landmark	High-Level	Meeting	of	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	in	2011,	States	acknowledged	the	global	burden	and	threat	of	NCDs.	In	particular,	that	NCDs	constitute	‘one	of	the	major	challenges	for	development	in	the	twenty-first	century,	which	undermines	social	and	economic	development	throughout	the	world’	and	are	‘a	threat	to	the	economies	of	many	Member	States’	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	2011).	The	World	Economic	Forum	estimates	that	the	economic	costs	of	NCDs	due	to	lost	productivity	and	direct	medical	costs	in	low-	and	middle-income	countries	over	the	next	two	decades	could	surpass	US$7trillion	(Bloom	et	al.	2011).	There	is	thus	a	pressing	need	to	address	the	common	risk	factors	for	NCDs,	which	must	include	comprehensive	policy	action	to	improve	diets	and	nutrition	(WHO	2013).			The	World	Health	Organization’s	Global	Action	Plan	for	Prevention	and	Control	of	NCDs	recommends	a	range	of	policy	options	for	promoting	healthy	diets	to	Member	States.	These	include:	“Promote	nutrition	labelling,	according	to	but	not	limited	to,	international	standards…	for	all	pre-packaged	foods	...”,	in	conjunction	with	a	range	of	other	policy	actions	including	taxes	and	subsidies,	advertising	restrictions	and	nutrition	education	(WHO	2013).	In	this	context,	nutrition	labelling	refers	to	information	found	on	the	labels	of	prepackaged	foods.	
	
What	is	interpretive	nutrition	labelling?	
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Interpretive	front-of-pack	labels	provide	simplified	”interpretations”	of	information	on	key	nutrients	in	relation	to	health,	to	encourage	and	enable	consumers	to	make	healthier	choices	(Wartella	et	al.	2012,	p9).	Such	labels	can	include	nutrient-specific	text	and/or	symbols,	a	summary	indicator	of	the	healthfulness	of	a	food,	or	situate	a	food	within	a	food	group	(and	associated	recommendations	for	consumption).	Examples	include	“traffic	light”	labels,	healthy	choice	logos,	and	Daily	Intake	Guides.	An	interpretive	approach	to	labeling	contrasts	with	the	common	presentation	of	detailed	nutrient	content	information	in	back-of-pack	“Nutrition	Information	Panels”.	An	increasing	number	of	governments	and	food	businesses	are	using	these	interpretive	labels	to	communicate	nutrition	information	to	consumers	(European	Food	Information	Council	2014).			Evidence	from	systematic	reviews	and	recent	studies	indicates	that	interpretive	front-of-pack	labelling	approaches	are	more	effective	for	communicating	nutrition	information,	than	listing	nutrient	content	on	the	back	of	food	packages.	Interpretive	front-of-pack	labels	can	increase	awareness	of	nutrition/health	among	consumers	and	their	motivation	to	choose	healthier	products,	with	simple,	‘low	density’	and	coloured	labels	being	most	effective	(Figure	1)	(Campos	et	al.	2011,	Graham	et	al.	2012,	van	Herpen	et	al.	2012,	Bialkova	et	al.	2013,	Hersey	et	al.	2013,	Van	Kleef	and	Dagevosb	2014,	Siegrist	et	al.	2015,	Volkova	and	Ni	Mhurchu	2015).	Such	labelling	also	increases	the	likelihood	that	consumers	make	healthier	food	choices	(Campos,	Doxey	et	al.	2011,	Hersey,	Wohlgenant	et	al.	2013,	Babio	et	al.	2014,	Maubach	et	al.	2014,	Van	Kleef	and	Dagevosb	2014,	Volkova	and	Ni	Mhurchu	2015).	There	is	some	evidence	that	interpretive	front-of-pack	labels	can	also	stimulate	reformulation	of	less	healthy	food	products	(Vyth	et	al.	2010).	
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	Figure	1:	Logic	model	for	the	effect	of	interpretive	front-of-pack	labelling	on	health		
Nutrition	labelling	as	a	trade	policy	issue	Regulation	of	nutrition	labelling	falls	under	the	remit	of	not	just	the	health	sector	but	also	trade.	Because	food	is	traded	across	borders,	food	labels	also	cross	borders,	yet	labeling	requirements	may	differ	between	countries.	Nutrition	labelling	requirements	may	thus	create	‘technical	barriers’	to	the	free	movement	of	packaged	foods	across	borders.	As	such	they	fall	under	the	remit	of	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	agreements,	the	most	relevant	being	the	WTO	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	(the	"TBT	Agreement").	(Although	the	Agreement	on	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	Measures	is	usually	considered	the	agreement	covering	food,	it	is	more	focussed	on	ensuring	that	food	safety	regulations	do	not	unnecessarily	impede	trade.	Food	labelling	measures	are	more	likely	to	fall	under	rules	in	the	TBT	Agreement	because	they	set	requirements	on	the	characteristics	of	the	goods	themselves.)		“Technical	regulations”	refer	to	mandatory	requirements	regarding	the	characteristics	of	goods,	including	labels.	The	TBT	Agreement	addresses	the	preparation,	adoption	and	application	of	technical	regulations	affecting	trade	in	all	goods	(WTO	1994).	An	important	aim	of	the	TBT	Agreement	is	to	minimise	the	use	of	policy	measures,	and	
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particularly	technical	regulations,	that	are	“disguised	restrictions	on	international	trade”	(WTO	1994).	Under	the	TBT	Agreement,	technical	regulations	that	pursue	a	“legitimate	policy	objective”	(including	protection	of	human	health)	are	permitted,	but	should:	avoid	discrimination	between	imported	and	domestically	produced	goods;	not	be	unnecessarily	trade-restrictive;	and	be	based	on	relevant	international	standards	when	appropriate	and	effective	(Box	1).		The	international	standard	most	likely	to	be	relevant	is	the	“Codex	Alimentarius”;	harmonised	international	food	standards	to	protect	consumer	health	and	promote	fair	practices	in	food	trade	(see	Box	2).			The	TBT	Agreement	recognises	that	each	WTO	Member	has	the	basic	right	to	protect	human	health	and	in	doing	so	to	choose	its	own	level	of	protection	from	health	risks.	However,	from	a	trade	perspective	it	is	important	that	the	exercise	of	this	right	does	not	unnecessarily	restrict	trade.	The	TBT	Committee	provides	a	forum	for	WTO	members	to	find	out	more	about	the	scope	and	implementation	of	each	other’s	regulations	in	light	of	the	obligations	imposed	by	the	TBT	Agreement.	WTO	Members	can	use	the	Committee	to	raise	“Specific	Trade	Concerns”	regarding	laws,	regulations	or	procedures	of	other	countries	that	may	affect	their	trade.	The	vast	majority	of	concerns	do	not	escalate	to	formal	disputes,	rather,	the	work	of	the	Committee	helps	to	defuse	potential	trade	frictions	(WTO	2015b).	
	In	this	paper,	we	analyse	the	substance	of	Specific	Trade	Concerns	regarding	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	that	have	been	raised	in	the	TBT	Committee.	The	aim	of	our	analysis	is	to	identify	opportunities	for	stronger	policy	making	for	interpretive	nutrition	labelling.		
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Box	1:	Summary	of	key	commitments	within	the	Agreement	on	TBT,	relevant	to	
Specific	Trade	Concerns	on	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	
	Preamble:	no	country	should	be	prevented	from	taking	measures	necessary	for	the	protection	of	human	health	Article	2.1:	Technical	regulations	shall	treat	“like	products”	the	same,	both	imported	and	domestically	produced	Article	2.2:	Technical	regulations	should	not	create	unnecessary	obstacles	to	trade	(not	be	more	trade	restrictive	than	necessary	to	fulfil	a	legitimate	objective),	taking	account	of	the	risks	non-fulfilment	would	create	Article	2.4:	Members	should	use	relevant	international	standards	as	the	basis	for	technical	regulations	Article	2.5:	If	a	measure	may	have	a	significant	effect	on	trade,	members	shall	explain	the	justification	for	the	measure	at	the	request	of	another	member.	However,	if	a	measure	is	designed	to	achieve	a	legitimate	objective	and	is	based	on	international	standards,	it	shall	be	rebuttably	presumed	not	to	create	an	unnecessary	barrier	to	trade.		Article	2.9:	If	a	measure	is	not	in	accordance	with	international	standards	(or	no	relevant	standard	exists),	members	shall	notify	other	members,	provide	information,	and	allow	time	for	comment	Article	2.12:	Members	shall	allow	a	reasonable	time	between	publication	and	entry	into	force	of	the	measure,	to	allow	for	implementation		
Source:	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade,	WTO	(WTO	1994)	
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Method	We	identified	Specific	Trade	Concerns	regarding	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	through	searching	the	WTO	database	Documents	Online	and	the	TBT	database	using	the	key	words	“nutrition”,	“health”	and	“label”	(for	all	years),	and	direct	query	to	the	WTO	TBT	Committee	secretariat.	We	then	searched	the	WTO	database	using	the	country	name	and	the	item	number	to	extract	all	relevant	meeting	minutes	related	to	each	Specific	Trade	Concern.	The	searches	were	conducted	between	October	2014	and	May	2015.	We	entered	the	full	text	of	meeting	minutes	regarding	each	Specific	Trade	Concern	into	NVivo	10,	and	coded	these	by	meeting	date	and	country	name.		We	analysed	the	text	of	the	discussion	relating	to	these	Specific	Trade	Concerns	according	to	the	articles	of	the	TBT	Agreement	(see	Box	1).	Themes	were	identified	based	on	pre-determined	codes.	The	research	team	collaboratively	developed	a	codebook	that	identified	key	phrases	relating	to	policy	design,	process	and	implementation	against	each	Article	of	the	TBT	agreement,	informed	by	issues	raised	in	previous	legal	disputes	regarding	TBT.	For	example,	the	codes	related	to	Article	2.2	were:	unnecessary	obstacles	to	trade;	risk	assessment;	legitimate	objective;	alternatives;	
ineffective	and	not	achieving	the	objective;	and	more	trade	restrictive	than	necessary.	Codes	related	to	Article	2.9	were:	implementation	timeframes;	implementation	logistics;	and	implementation	query.		Three	authors	independently	coded	all	text,	and	the	lead	author	made	final	decisions	on	coding.	We	compared	the	coded	data	across	countries,	and	synthesized	the	findings	based	on	the	key	issues	discussed	in	the	TBT	Committee.		
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	As	one	key	aim	of	our	analysis	was	to	inform	future	policy	making	–	including	in	other	jurisdictions	–	we	considered	theories	of	policy	learning	in	identifying	lessons	from	our	findings.	In	particular,	we	drew	on	Hall’s	‘social	learning’	perspective,	which	emphases	the	need	to	consider	the	framing	of	policy	problems,	and	the	relationships	between	policy	goals	and	instruments,	to	enable	learning	by	policy	makers	(Hall	1993).	We	thus	focused	our	discussion	on	how	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	was	–	and	could	be	–	framed	as	a	policy	solution,	in	order	to	reduce	tensions	between	trade	commitments	and	nutrition	goals,	how	the	policy	‘problem’	addressed	by	labelling	could	be	framed,	how	nutrition	labelling	as	a	policy	instrument	could	be	more	specifically	linked	to	policy	goals	and	objectives,	and	broader	issues	of	policy	coherence	between	trade	and	nutrition.		
Results	We	identified	five	Specific	Trade	Concerns	regarding	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	raised	in	the	WTO’s	TBT	Committee.		Concerns	were	first	raised	at	the	meeting	of	March	2007	regarding	Thailand’s	proposed	front	of	pack	labelling	for	snack	foods.	New	Specific	Trade	Concerns	were	first	raised	in	2013	regarding	Chile,	Peru	and	Indonesia,	and	in	2014	regarding	Ecuador.	Five	meeting	minutes	contained	discussion	relevant	to	Thailand	(M42-46);	seven	relevant	to	Chile	(M59-65);	six	relevant	to	Peru	(M60-65);	six	relevant	to	Indonesia	(M60-65);	and	four	relevant	to	Ecuador	(M62-65).			All	the	measures	subject	to	Specific	Trade	Concerns	included	mandatory	requirements	for	front-of-pack	text	and	images,	targeting	nutrients	relevant	to	the	prevention	of	
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NCDs.	We	present	summaries	of	each	measure	below,	based	on	information	presented	in	the	TBT	meeting	discussions.		
Summary	of	labelling	measures	subject	to	Specific	Trade	Concerns	
Thailand	In	2007,	concerns	were	raised	regarding	the	government	of	Thailand’s	2006	proposal	for	a	mandatory	front-of-pack	warning	label	(“Children	Should	Take	Less”)	and	traffic-light-like	presentation	of	nutrition	information	for	five	categories	of	snack	foods	commonly	consumed	by	children	(WTO	2007c).	This	was	part	of	a	comprehensive	policy	approach	to	reducing	malnutrition	in	children.	Implementation	was	postponed	in	2008,	and	in	2013	Thailand	implemented	an	alternative	measure	including	a	warning	label	(“consume	small	amount	and	exercise	for	healthy	condition”)	and	mandatory	Guideline	Daily	Amounts	labelling	for	certain	categories	of	processed	foods,	after	which	there	have	been	no	further	concerns	raised	in	the	TBT	Committee	(WTO	2013a).		
Chile	In	2013,	concerns	were	raised	in	the	TBT	committee	regarding	the	government	of	Chile’s	proposed	mandatory	nutrition	information	requirement	to	prevent	obesity	and	NCDs	through	provision	of	improved	nutrition	information,	as	an	addition	to	existing	nutrition	promotion	strategies	(WTO	2014b).	This	applied	to	certain	categories	of	processed	foods,	in	the	form	of	an	octagonal	"STOP	sign"	covering	20%	of	the	package,	but	was	amended	in	2014	to	hexagonal	labels	for	foods	exceeding	thresholds	for	saturated	fats,	sodium,	sugar	or	calories	(WTO	2014b).	The	regulation	was	developed	in	a	consultative	process,	and	was	based	on	health	data	showing	rising	rates	of	child	obesity	and	related	NCDs.		
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Indonesia	In	2013,	concerns	were	raised	in	the	TBT	committee	regarding	the	government	of	Indonesia’s	proposed	mandatory	labelling	(including	warning	labels)	for	sugar,	fat	and	sodium	content	on	processed	and	fast	foods,	to	better	inform	consumers	about	nutrition	and	prevent	NCDs	(WTO	2013c).	The	labelling	requirements	were	based	on	the	Balance	Nutrition	Guidelines	and	related	2008	WHO	recommendations,	as	well	as	data	from	a	2014	nutrition	survey	conducted	by	the	Ministry	of	Health	(WTO	2015a).		
Peru	In	2013,	concerns	were	raised	in	the	TBT	committee	regarding	the	government	of	Peru’s	proposed	mandatory	interpretive	label	for	processed	foods	(including	a	warning	label),	part	of	the	“Act	to	Promote	Healthy	Eating	Among	Children	and	Adolescents”.	The	objective	of	the	measure	was	to	reduce	obesity	and	NCDs,	although	details	of	the	measure	were	still	being	finalised	at	the	time	of	the	March	2015	meeting	of	the	TBT	Committee	(WTO	2015a).	The	measure	was	part	of	a	comprehensive	policy	approach	to	preventing	NCDs.			
Ecuador	In	2014,	concerns	were	raised	in	the	TBT	Committee	regarding	the	government	of	Ecuador’s	proposed	mandatory	graphic	labelling	(“traffic	light	labelling”)	for	content	of	salt,	sugar	and	fat	(WTO	2014c).	The	regulations	aim	to	combat	Ecuador’s	rising	rates	of	obesity,	cardiovascular	disease	and	diabetes,	identified	in	a	survey	conducted	by	the	Ministry	of	Health	in	2012,	by	addressing	the	lack	of	information	on	food	labels	(WTO	2014c).	The	measure	was	part	of	a	comprehensive	policy	package	to	improve	nutrition	
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and	prevent	NCDs,	and	based	on	indicator	3.3.1	of	the	Pan	American	Health	Organization's	Plan	of	Action,	as	well	as	a	systematic	review	of	scientific	evidence	on	interpretive	labelling	(WTO	2015a).	
	
Analysis	of	discussions	and	concerns	raised	Notably,	in	all	Specific	Trade	Concerns	regarding	nutrition	labelling,	members	raising	concerns	identified	the	objectives	pursued	by	the	countries	proposing	mandatory	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	as	shared,	legitimate	objectives	(Article	2.2,	see	Box	1).		These	legitimate	objectives	were	articulated	during	meetings	as:	“providing	consumers	with	sufficient	information	about	the	food	which	they	consume	and	reducing	non-communicable	diseases”;	“provide	consumers	with	information	so	as	to	make	appropriate	dietary	choices	and	reduce	the	risk	of	diet-related	NCDs”;	“empower	consumers	to	make	an	informed	choice	in	order	to	foster	effective	competition	and	consumer	welfare”	(WTO	2014d);	and	other	similar	wordings.		There	were	also	no	allegations	of	national	discrimination	(Article	2.1)	regarding	these	mandatory	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	initiatives.			However,	members	raised	concerns	about	the	interpretative	labelling	measures	for	the	following	reasons.		
Need	for	justification	of	the	measures	Under	the	commitments	in	the	TBT	Agreement,	WTO	members	can	request	justification	for	another	member’s	measure	if	it	may	have	a	significant	effect	on	trade	(Article	2.5).	Justification	should	specifically	address	issues	in	Articles	2.2	and	2.3,	including:	the	necessity	of	the	measure,	in	relation	to	its	effect	on	trade;	its	effectiveness	in	achieving	
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the	objective	pursued;	its	proportionality	to	the	risk	involved;	and	whether	there	are	alternatives	that	could	achieve	the	policy	goal,	with	less	impact	on	trade	(see	Box	1).	However,	this	requirement	for	justification	is	lessened	if	the	measure	is	based	on	a	relevant	international	standard	and	is	designed	to	achieve	a	legitimate	objective	(Article	2.5;	see	Box	1).			More	trade	restrictive	than	necessary		Members	stated	that	all	interpretive	labelling	measures	are	likely	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	trade	(Article	2.2,	Article	2.6).	The	effect	on	trade	is	largely	due	to	the	mandatory	nature	of	the	labelling,	and	that	each	system	was	unique	to	the	implementing	country:	exporters	in	other	countries	would	need	to	comply	with	a	novel	system	of	food	labelling	for	only	one	of	their	export	markets	(WTO	2013b,	WTO	2014a).	In	some	cases	concerns	were	also	raised	about	further	barriers	to	trade	resulting	from	the	implementation	requirements	of	the	measures,	such	as	the	‘multiplicity	of	documents’	required	to	prove	conformity	with	the	regulations	(WTO	2013c,	WTO	2015a).		All	members	raising	concerns	indicated	that	all	the	proposed	measures	were	likely	to	be	more	trade	restrictive	than	necessary;	placing	unnecessary	burdens	on	producers,	exporters	or	consumers	(Article	2.2).	The	TBT	Agreement	gives	members	the	right	to	determine	the	level	of	protection	(e.g.	of	public	health)	they	deem	appropriate	when	pursuing	legitimate	objectives.	However,	this	‘necessity	test’	indicates	that	there	should	be	a	degree	of	proportionality	between	a	measure’s	trade	restrictiveness	and	the	risk	that	the	measure	seeks	to	mitigate.		
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In	the	discussions	relating	to	all	interpretive	labelling	measures,	members	suggested	that	there	was	insufficient	evidence	for	effectiveness	that	would	‘necessitate’	the	significant	impact	on	trade	anticipated	(see	following	section	for	further	details	on	evidence).	For	example,	comments	such	as	“the	Peruvian	measure	might	be	more	trade	restrictive	than	necessary	to	achieve	the	stated	legitimate	objective	of	reducing	obesity	in	order	to	fight	noncommunicable	diseases.	In	this	context,	it	[is]	absolutely	essential	to	know	the	scientific	basis	of	the	measure”	(WTO	2013c).		In	all	Specific	Trade	Concerns,	concerns	regarding	trade	restrictiveness	were	also	linked	directly	to	lack	of	consistency	of	the	measures	with	international	standards.	For	example,	comments	such	as	“[Chile’s]	regulatory	proposals	...deviate	from	international	standards,	may	not	have	a	scientific	basis	and	would	likely	be	more	trade-restrictive	than	necessary”	(WTO	2013c).	Trade	restrictiveness	was	also	linked	to	the	potential	availability	of	alternative	measures;	for	example,	“Indonesia	could	consider	less	trade	restrictive	alternative	measures	that	could	also	achieve	its	consumer	health	objective”(WTO	2014c),	“questions	as	to	whether	the	[Thai]	measure	was	necessary	in	light	of	potential	alternatives”(WTO	2009),	and	“[Ecuador’s]	system	of	colour	coded	charts	may	...	not	constitute	the	least	restrictive	alternative	necessary	to	fulfil	the	desired	legitimate	objective”	(WTO	2014a).		Members	raising	concerns	also	indicated	two	practical	issues	that	potentially	made	the	measures	more	trade	restrictive	than	necessary.	The	first	related	to	specific	policy	settings,	such	as	detailed	and	prescriptive	requirements	for	the	placement	and	size	of	the	interpretive	label	(particularly	in	relation	to	small	packages)	(WTO	2013c,	WTO	2015a).	One	issue	raised	repeatedly	is	whether	stickers	could	be	used	for	the	labelling	–	
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this	was	identified	as	a	strategy	that	would	make	it	simpler	for	industry	to	comply	and	make	the	measure	less	trade	restrictive	(WTO	2013c).	A	second	issue	was	the	requirement,	in	some	cases,	such	as	Chile,	to	label	a	large	range	of	foods.		Scientific	evidence	for	effectiveness	of	the	measure	in	achieving	the	objective	Regarding	the	justification	for	all	the	measures,	queries	were	raised	regarding	the	evidence	for	their	effectiveness	in	achieving	the	(legitimate)	policy	objective	of	improving	diets	and	preventing	NCDs	(Article	2.2)	(WTO	2013b,	WTO	2015a).	A	repeated	query	was	the	need	for	information	regarding	the	scientific	basis	for	nutrient	thresholds,	on	which	the	labelling	was	based.	For	example,	queries	such	as	“what	scientific	evidence	was	behind	[Ecuador’s]	categories	for	levels	of	concentration	of	nutritional	components?”	(WTO	2015a).		Information	was	also	requested	regarding	the	selection	of	target	foods	and	food	categories.	For	example,	“[no]	clear	understanding	of	the	criteria	used	to	add	or	remove	foods	to	or	from	Thailand's	list	of	applicable	foods,	and	the	reasons	why	some	categories	had	been	included	and	others	not”	(WTO	2007b).	This	was	linked	to	concerns	that	the	measures	selectively	applied	to	packaged	foods	or	only	certain	snack	foods.		For	example,	“...questioned	the	scientific	merit	of	the	proposed	[Thai]	regulation	and	argued	that	it	discriminated	against	snack	foods”(WTO	2008).	Similarly,	another	member	queried	why	Chile’s	proposed	regulation	did	not	apply	to	meals	sold	in	fast	food	chains,	or	products	such	as	sausage,	hamburger,	cheese	and	chocolate	(WTO	2014c).			
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Concerns	about	effectiveness	were	in	many	cases	linked	to	whether	the	measures	were	proportional	to	the	policy	objective	pursued.	In	particular,	comments	that	the	use	of	expressions	such	as	“high	in”,	warning	labels,	and	symbols	such	as	“stop	signs”	may	have	the	effect	of	creating	consumer	fear	or	mislead	consumers	through	“demonising”	foods	required	to	have	“negative”	labels	showing	high	amounts	of	nutrients	associated	with	NCD	risk	(WTO	2014c).			The	potential	for	less	trade	restrictive	alternative	measures	to	achieve	the	policy	objectives	The	necessity	of	a	measure	is	linked	to	the	availability	of	less	trade	restrictive	
alternatives.	If	a	less	trade	restrictive	alternative	measure	would	equally	fulfil	the	policy	objective	and	is	reasonably	available,	that	measure	would	be	preferable	from	the	perspective	of	international	trade	law.		In	the	context	of	concerns	regarding	interpretive	nutrition	labelling,	almost	all	members	raising	concerns	queried	the	availability	of	alternative	measures.	For	example,	comments	such	as	“had	[Ecuador]	considered	alternative,	less	restrictive	measures	that	would	encourage	the	consumer	to	...	make	the	appropriate	choice?”	(WTO	2014b),	or	“had	[Indonesia]	considered	less	trade	restrictive	alternatives	to	pursue	its	objective?”	(WTO	2014b).		Members	raising	concerns	also	identified	potential	alternative	measures	to	achieve	the	policy	objective.	Specific	alternatives	to	interpretive	labelling	identified	in	the	text	(particularly	in	2014	and	2015	meetings)	included	voluntary	approaches	being	undertaken	by	Australia,	the	EU	and	Switzerland	(WTO	2014a,	WTO	2015a).		This	
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suggests	that	a	key	concern	regarding	trade	restrictiveness	is	the	mandatory	nature	of	the	measures.		Another	alternative	proposed	was	the	use	of	current	Codex	Alimentarius	Guidelines	as	the	basis	for	labelling.	For	example,	“using	the	Codex	Nutrient	Reference	Values	for	labelling	purposes	for	sodium	and	saturated	fat,	which	provided	another	means	for	consumers	to	identify	foods	"low"	and	"high"	in	nutrients	of	concern	and	the	Codex	"low"	claims,	"no	added	sugars"	claims,	and	other	conditions	for	health	claims”	(WTO	2014b).	In	four	instances,	education	campaigns	were	identified	as	potential	alternative	policy	measures	(WTO	2013c,	WTO	2014c,	WTO	2014d).		
Consistency	with	international	standards	Harmonization	of	technical	regulations	helps	to	facilitate	international	trade.	For	this	reason,	the	TBT	Agreement	strongly	encourages	members	to	use	“relevant”	international	standards,	guides	or	recommendations	“as	a	basis”	for	their	regulations	and	standards	(Article	2.4).	This	incentive	is	strengthened	by	Article	2.5’s	conferral	of	a	presumption	that	a	measure	does	not	create	an	unnecessary	obstacle	to	international	trade	if	it	is	prepared	in	accordance	with	relevant	international	standards.	At	the	same	time,	the	Agreement	also	recognizes	that	harmonization	on	the	basis	of	international	standards	may	not	be	desirable	in	all	contexts	due	to	divergent	national	preferences	and	circumstances.			All	the	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	measures	were	subject	to	concerns	regarding	their	deviation	from	the	Codex	Alimentarius	Guidelines	(see	Box	2).	One	common	concern	was	that	interpretive	labelling	was	inconsistent	with	the	Codex	Guideline	
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stating	that	the	nutrient	declaration	"should	not	lead	consumers	to	believe	that	there	is	exact	quantitative	knowledge	of	what	individuals	should	eat	in	order	to	maintain	health,	but	rather	to	convey	an	understanding	of	the	quantity	of	nutrients	contained	in	the	product"	(Codex	Alimentarius	Committee	2013).			In	addition,	members	noted	that	the	current	Codex	Guidelines	do	not	identify	criteria	for	labelling	foods	as	“high	in”	calories,	salt,	fat	or	sugar	(WTO	2013c,	WTO	2014b).	For	example,	comments	such	as	“No	nutrient	thresholds	have	been	established	by	the	Codex	for	the	nutrients	targeted	by	the	Peruvian	legislation”	(WTO	2013c).		Other	potentially	relevant	standards	identified	by	the	members	raising	concerns		included	WHO's	dietary	guidelines	(WTO	2013c,	WTO	2014d),	the	WHO	"Global	Action	Plan	for	the	Prevention	and	Control	of	Noncommunicable	Diseases	2013-2020"	(WTO	2014a),	and	recommendations	by	the	World	Health	Organization/Pan	American	Health	Organization	(WHO/PAHO)	(WTO	2015a).	Two	members	indicated	none	of	the	current	international	standards	were	relevant	to	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	(WTO	2014d,	WTO	2015a).			
Box	2:	What	are	the	potentially	relevant	standards?	Key	points	of	Codex	
Alimentarius	Commission	guidance	relevant	to	nutrition	labelling		The	main	standards	setting	body	with	respect	to	food	safety	is	the	Codex	Alimentarius	Commission	(‘Codex’),	established	by	the	World	Health	Organization	and	United	Nations	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization.	Codex	has	developed	two	standards	specific	
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to	nutrition	labelling:	the	Guidelines	on	Nutrition	Labelling	and	the	General	Standard	for	Labelling	of	Prepackaged	Food	
	Guidelines	on	Nutrition	Labelling(Codex	Alimentarius	Commisssion	2013):	Information	should	be	supplied	only	for	nutrients	considered	important,	and	‘…should	not	lead	consumers	to	believe	that	there	is	exact	quantitative	knowledge	of	what	individuals	should	eat	in	order	to	maintain	health,	but	rather	to	convey	an	understanding	of	the	quantity	of	nutrients	contained	in	the	product.’		Supplementary	nutrition	information	“…is	intended	to	increase	the	consumer’s	understanding	of	the	nutritional	value	of	their	food	and	to	assist	in	interpreting	the	nutrient	declaration.	There	are	a	number	of	ways	of	presenting	such	information	...”	And	“…should	be	accompanied	by	consumer	education	programmes	to	increase	consumer	understanding	and	use	of	the	information.”...			General	Standard	for	the	Labelling	of	Prepackaged	Food(Codex	Alimentarius	Commisssion	2010):	Labels	and	labelling	on	prepackaged	food	should	not	present	food	in	such	a	way	that	is	“false,	misleading	or	deceptive,	or	is	likely	to	create	an	erroneous	impression.”				Potentially	relevant	reference	points	for	labelling	regarding	nutrients:	-	Nutrient	reference	values	(NRVs)	for	NCDs	(sodium	and	saturated	fat)		-	The	Guidelines	for	Use	of	Nutrition	and	Health	Claims	regarding:	sodium	and	saturated	fats	(section	6.3.1),	“light”	(section	6.5)	and	sugars	and	sodium/salt	(sections	7.1	and	7.2).	
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Lack	of	time	for	comment	The	apparent	lack	of	consistency	between	the	measures	and	existing	international	standards	means	that	they	are	subject	to	Article	2.9	of	the	TBT	Agreement.	This	Article	addresses	processes	for	notification	to	the	WTO,	including	allowing	time	for	comment	on	draft	regulations	(see	Box	1).	These	provisions	relate	to	transparency	as	a	fundamental	pillar	of	the	TBT	Agreement,	and	are	a	key	element	of	‘good	regulatory	practice’.			Members	repeatedly	raised	concerns	regarding	the	measures	proposed	by	Chile,	Ecuador,	Indonesia	and	Peru	related	to	the	lack	of	formal	notification	of	proposed	measures	and/or	amendments,	the	amount	of	time	allowed	for	comment	by	other	members,	and	relatively	short	timeframes	for	implementation	(WTO	2013b,	WTO	2013c,	WTO	2014c,	WTO	2014d,	WTO	2014a,	WTO	2014b,	WTO	2015a).	Even	where	timelines	for	implementation	exceeded	that	prescribed	by	Article	2.9	of	the	TBT	Agreement	(for	example,	Chile	allowed	one	year),	this	was	argued	to	be	insufficient	in	comparison	to	that	allowed	for	other	labelling	interventions,	such	as	the	voluntary	scheme	implemented	by	the	EU	(3	year	implementation	timeframe).	 	
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Discussion	This	analysis	of	Specific	Trade	Concerns	raised	in	the	TBT	Committee	over	the	past	decade	–	and	particularly	since	2013	–	underscores	the	need	to	consider	public	health	nutrition	labeling	interventions	also	as	trade	policy	interventions.	Nutrition	labelling	for	public	health	purposes	has	been	consistently	identified	in	discussions	in	the	WTO	TBT	Committee	as	a	legitimate	policy	objective.	However,	queries	have	been	raised	regarding	the	justification	of	the	specific	labelling	measures	proposed,	and	the	scientific	evidence	for	effectiveness	of	such	measures.	Concerns	have	also	been	raised	regarding	the	consistency	of	the	measures	with	international	standards.		Our	analysis	should	also	be	considered	in	the	light	of	the	political	economy	of	trade.	WTO	disputes	regarding	trade	and	tobacco	have	indicated	that	concerns	regarding	compliance	with	WTO	Agreements	are	also	influenced	by	economic	and	political	interests.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	plain	packaging	of	tobacco,	formal	disputes	were	raised	regarding	WTO	compliance,	even	though	legal	analyses	indicated	that	the	legislation	was	formally	compliant	with	global	trade	law	(Mitchell	2010,	Jarman	2013).	Other	observers	have	noted	the	use	of	trade	and	investment	disputes	to	undermine	and/or	stall	tobacco	control	legislation	(Lencucha	and	Drope	2015).	This	has	significant	relevance	to	nutrition,	where	the	processed	food	industry	is	a	significant	political	actor	and	has	been	seen	to	lobby	effectively	against	mandatory	labelling	(Mandle	et	al.	2015).	In	addition	–	and	unlike	tobacco	–	there	is	no	international	convention	or	specific	standard	regarding	nutrition	labelling	for	NCD	prevention.	In	this	context,	there	is	thus	an	imbalance	between	the	strong	global	policy	norms	regarding	trade	(economic	interests)	and	weak	global	policy	norms	regarding	nutrition	policy.		
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Theories	of	policy	learning	can	help	to	reframe	policy	challenges	as	opportunities,	by	highlighting	considerations	relevant	to	other	jurisdictions	or	other	times	(Rose	1993).	Hall’s	theory	of	social	learning	highlights	key	issues	influencing	learning	as	framing,	the	context	in	which	policy	makers	work,	and	the	importance	of	policy	design	(Hall	1993).	We	identified	four	lessons	for	public	health	policy	makers	that	arise	from	this	analysis	of	discussions	in	the	TBT	Committee:	to	frame	the	policy	objectives	strategically,	in	relation	to	the	necessity	of	the	measure;	to	strengthen	policy	processes	in	ways	that	pro-actively	identify	potential	trade	issues;	and	to	minimise	(where	possible)	potential	trade	restrictiveness,	or	what	was	referred	to	in	the	TBT	Committee	discussions	as	‘practical’	concerns;	and	to	engage	with	the	Codex	Alimentarius	Commission	processes	to	develop	international	guidance	on	interpretative	labelling.		
	First,	strategic	framing	of	the	policy	objectives	to	align	clearly	with	the	policy	settings	can	assist	in	demonstrating	the	necessity	of	the	measure.	Although	the	‘legitimate	objective’	of	protecting	human	health	should	be	invoked,	it	is	essential	that	the	objective	of	the	measure	is	defined	in	relation	to	how	the	measure	will	address	the	specific	problem,	because	the	policy	objective	defines	the	evidence	required	to	establish	necessity.	For	example,	if	a	mandatory	nutrition	labelling	measure	is	stated	to	pursue	an	objective	of	providing	consumers	with	nutrition	information	in	a	more	understandable	format,	then	a	challenging	member	would	need	to	show	there	are	less	trade	restrictive	alternatives	that	would	equally	fulfil	this	aim.	Previous	disputes	highlight	the	high	threshold	applied	to	this	test.	Where	an	alternative	means	of	achieving	the	objective	entails	greater	‘risks’	that	the	objective	will	not	be	fulfilled,	this	will	not	be	considered	a	valid	alternative,	even	if	it	were	less	trade	restrictive	(WTO	2011).	In	contrast,	where	a	measure	is	framed	as	pursuing	a	broader	objective	of	reducing	the	burden	of	obesity	or	
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NCDs,	this	opens	potential	scope	for	a	complainant	to	propose	a	wider	variety	of	measures	that	may	achieve	this	aim.				This	suggests	that	objectives	need	to	be	framed	in	relation	to	the	first	point	of	impact	of	the	measure,	which	is	usually	provision	of	understandable	information	(Figure	1).	Evidence	to	justify	the	measure	would	then	focus	on:	best	available	current	advice	on	healthy	consumption	levels	(either	a	country’s	own	daily	recommended	levels,	or	some	internationally	accepted	advice),	clarity	and	accuracy	of	messaging	(regarding	the	need	for	‘interpretive’	labelling),	and	understanding	by	consumers	with	limited	literacy	(again	the	need	for	‘interpretive’	labelling).	It	will	also	be	important	to	explicitly	cite	the	precautionary	principle	in	response	to	queries	regarding	‘science’	and	‘scientific	justification’	for	these	novel	and	innovative	policy	measures	that	have	little	‘in	situ’	evidence	for	their	effect.	It	would	also	be	ideal	to	include	plans	for	evaluation	to	contribute	to	the	state	of	knowledge	regarding	effectiveness	of	interpretive	labelling.		In	relation	to	this,	it	is	also	important	that	interpretive	labelling	measures	be	framed	as	part	of	a	comprehensive	policy	response	to	nutrition-related	chronic	disease	alongside	components	such	as	education	programs,	minimizing	the	opportunity	to	suggest	these	are	available	as	‘less	trade	restrictive	alternatives.’	It	is	notable	that	in	previous	disputes,	an	alternative	measure	has	not	been	considered	‘reasonably	available’	where	it	is	more	properly	considered	part	of	a	suite	of	complementary	measures	intended	to	act	in	concert	with	the	mandatory	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	requirements	at	stake	(WTO	2007a).		
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Second,	the	findings	suggested	benefits	of	pro-active	engagement	with	trade	policy	makers	at	early	stages	of	policy	design.	In	particular,	this	would	help	to	identify	appropriate	points	and	avenues	for	notification	and	practical	issues	of	WTO	compliance,	such	as	allowing	sufficient	time	for	notification	and	implementation.	It	may	also	help	to	identify	any	easily	resolvable	trade	concerns	before	a	draft	is	notified.		Third,	the	findings	highlighted	opportunities	to	reduce	trade	restrictiveness	without	compromising	on	core	public	health	elements	of	label	design.	For	example,	it	may	be	possible	to	make	implementation	less	burdensome	through	the	use	of	stickers	and	graduated	implementation	timeframes.	Early	consideration	of	the	practicalities	of	implementation,	such	as	the	issue	related	to	package	size	identified	in	the	discussion,	may	also	reduce	trade-restrictiveness.	Although	the	voluntary	nature	of	the	measures	cited	as	alternatives	from	Australia,	Switzerland	and	the	EU	means	that	they	may	not	be	directly	comparable	to	these	mandatory	measures,	there	is	potential	to	draw	on	other	features	of	their	design.	For	example,	in	Australia,	the	high	level	policy	statement	which	guided	development	of	a	front-of-pack	labelling	system	establish	at	the	outset	that	such	a	system	is	not	a	stand-alone	strategy,	but	fits	within	the	context	of	broader	health	strategies,	including	explicit	recognition	of	its	role	in	supporting	the	Australian	Dietary	Guidelines	and	its	consistency	with	existing	Nutrient	Reference	Values.	Eight	aims	of	the	scheme	are	outlined,	drawing	on	evidence	of	its	potential	impact	on	both	consumer	understanding	and	improving	the	food	environment	through	driving	reformulation	(Australia	New	Zealand	Food	Regulation	Ministerial	Council).			Fourth,	one	of	the	key	issues	raised	by	the	discussions	in	the	TBT	Committee	is	whether	‘relevant’	international	standards	currently	exist.	As	described,	Codex	Alimentarius	
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leaves	room	for	interpretive	labelling	but	doesn’t	provide	guidance	regarding	details.	Codex	establishes	‘minimum	standards’	for	food	safety	–	providing	a	‘floor’	for	governments	to	draw	on	in	ensuring	food	safety,	while	allowing	for	differing	levels	of	protection	and	innovation	to	meet	emerging	challenges	(Cosbey	2000).	In	contrast,	the	emphasis	on	harmonisation	and	minimising	trade	restrictiveness	in	the	TBT	Agreement	suggests	the	need	for	specific	guidance	for	measures.	Previous	disputes	have	arisen	in	situations	such	as	this,	where	scientific	evidence	suggests	that	a	measure	stronger	than	existing	international	standards	is	advisable	to	protect	human	health	based	on	the	precautionary	principle	(Turvey	and	Mojduszka	2005).	This	tension	is	reflected	in	the	apparent	confusion	evident	in	the	TBT	discussions	about	whether	a	relevant	standard	exists.	This	suggests	a	need	for	development	of	international	guidance	regarding	evidence	and	use	of	interpretive	nutrition	labelling.	Ideally,	this	would	be	explicitly	framed	as	a	baseline	(rather	than	a	ceiling),	which	would	enable	it	to	serve	as	a	reference	point	for	national	action,	while	enabling	innovation.	
	The	requests	for	justification	regarding	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	measures	in	the	TBT	Committee	raise	the	question	of	whether	trade	sector	concerns	might	stifle	innovation	in	nutrition	labelling	policy.	Regulatory	chill	in	public	health	stemming	from	trade	concerns,	a	situation	in	which	governments	hesitate	to	implement	new	policies	or	legislation,	has	been	well	documented	(Tienhaara	2011).	Voluntary	approaches	to	labelling	were	repeatedly	identified	as	an	‘alternative’	to	these	mandatory	interpretive	labelling	measures	discussed	in	the	TBT	Committee.	This	suggests	that	a	specific	area	where	regulatory	chill	may	be	likely	to	result	is	in	the	adoption	of	voluntary	rather	than	mandatory	approaches	to	interpretive	nutrition	labelling.	This	potential	for	regulatory	chill	would	only	be	enhanced	by	the	preference	of	the	food	industry	for	voluntary	
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approaches	(Mandle,	Tugendhaft	et	al.	2015).	However,	strong	rationales	for	mandatory	approaches	remain.	For	example,	voluntary	approaches	may	have	limited	long	term	effectiveness,	due	to	disincentives	to	participate	resulting	from	costs	accruing	to	only	compliant	companies	(in	the	form	of	implementation	costs	and	perhaps	market	share)	(Roe	et	al.	2014).			Overall,	however,	this	analysis	of	discussions	in	the	TBT	Committee	indicates	that	there	is	significant	policy	space	at	the	international	level	for	innovation	in	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	policy,	and	has	highlighted	opportunities	to	strengthen	nutrition	labelling	measures	at	both	the	international	and	national	level.	This	policy	space	may	not	preclude	a	dispute	or	a	‘chill’,	since	the	behaviours	of	corporations	and	governments	are	not	fully	predictable;	but	care	in	how	interpretive	nutrition	labelling	measures	are	crafted	in	light	of	trade	concerns	can	minimize	such	a	risk	and	help	ensure	that	trade	policy	is	coherent	with	nutrition	action	(Hawkes	2015).		
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